

The Military Contribution to Human Security ¹

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When I spoke in June, Canada was at war. Now, our troops are on the ground, helping to build peace. It seems paradoxical to say that our cluster bombs contributed to human security. But I think they did. As long as hard power is used to attack civilians, hard power will be necessary to defend them, at home or abroad.

Kosovo has all the elements associated with Human Security. It is an internal conflict where we are concerned not with the protection of “national interests” but with the protection of individuals. As Czech President Vaclav Havel told the Canadian Parliament:

“Milosevic is not threatening either the territorial integrity or any other integrity of any NATO member. Nevertheless, the Alliance is fighting. It is fighting in the name of human interest for the fate of other human beings. It is fighting because decent people cannot sit back and watch systematic, state directed massacres of other people.”²

There is nothing new in this for Canada. From the North West Mounted Police to today’s peacekeepers, human interests as much as state interests have guided and motivated the deployment of Canada’s military assets.

Beyond this general principle I want to discuss the details of how an effective military force contributes to human security, at the grass-roots level. I am not drawing on high-level strategic thinking nor on theory, but on practical and concrete measures with which I have some personal experience.

As a Battery Commander in Cyprus I helped Canadian psychologist Ron Fisher with the Inter-Communal Conflict Resolution Steering Committee between Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot communities. As a military assistant to the Deputy Force Commander of UN Peace Forces in Former Yugoslavia, I saw Croatia’s expulsion of the Serbs from Western Slavonia and the Krajina, the Serb expulsion of Muslims from Srebrenica and Zepa, and the impact of NATO’s air strikes. Then as a civil affairs officer for NATO’s implementation force in Prijedor, one of the epicentres of ethnic cleansing, I had to

¹ These remarks represent the personal views of the author, and not necessarily those of the Department of National Defence, Canadian Armed Forces, or Royal Military College.

² Vaclav Havel, President of the Czech Republic, before the Houses of Parliament, 29 April 1999, Hansard, Volume 218, House of Commons.

support reconstruction and the return of refugees, dealing with the riots that were orchestrated by both sides. And last year, as a researcher at the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre I participated in a field experiment in community peacebuilding in Bosnia. This set out to test some of the ideas in circulation about how to deal with the aftermath of protracted violent conflict.

Beyond winning a just war, and securing a stable and equitable peace, how can military forces contribute to human security? I will say a few words about what human security is, and then suggest ways that Canada's armed forces can and do contribute to human security at two levels. In the microcosm of a military mission, Canadian soldiers can help civilians to build peaceful communities. In the bigger picture, Canada's military forces can help to build a peaceful international community through education. Both endeavours serve the cause of human security.

What is "human security"?

The Club of Rome currently identifies 11 areas of interest: environment, demography, development, values, governance, work, the information society, new technologies, education, global society and the world economic order. Each issue touches the lives of individuals in the degree to which their basic needs are met.

The UNDP Human Development Report of 1994 identified seven dimensions of human security: the economy, food, health, the environment, personal security, community security, and political security. Like the Club of Rome's issues, these clearly impact on individual's lives.

These concepts have a common flaw in practice. Although they are comprehensive in listing the things that can contribute to human security, they do not account for the way war and violent conflict can undermine it. Over the past two years, Canada's Minister for Foreign Affairs, Lloyd Axworthy, has defined more narrowly the concept of human security, and related it explicitly to the human costs of war.

Human Security means safety for people from both violent and non-violent threats. It is freedom from pervasive threats to people's basic rights, safety, and lives. The human security perspective does not supplant national security, but refuses to accept national security as an end in itself. State security and human security are mutually supportive, and a secure and stable world order depends both on secure states, and on meeting the security needs of people within states.

As the Department of Foreign Affairs put it in the recent paper, *Human Security: Safety for People in a Changing World*, "Security policies must be integrated with strategies for promoting human rights, democracy and good governance." This has big


implications for the way in which we deploy forces as part of multinational missions, taking remedial action for human security.

How can our deployed military forces contribute to human security?

So how can soldiers support human security? As a soldier talking about human security, I am open to attack from two sides. There are some who will say that relief and development, democratisation, governance, and reconciliation (all inherent parts of the human security agenda) are civilian issues that should not distract soldiers from their primary function—to provide for security in a dangerous world. There are others who will argue that when soldiers become involved in supporting the human security agenda, they interfere with the efforts of qualified civilians. Soldiers not only cost more than civilians, but also tend to militarise a situation that may then take longer to return to normal.

Let me be clear that I agree with both arguments. I am not suggesting an enlarged role for soldiers. When I describe a holistic approach to human security, it is clear to me that most of these functions cannot be performed adequately by soldiers. The military role is control and prevention of violence, and it requires all the tools of a modern combat force to perform that role. When they do become involved in the civilian tasks of humanitarian relief, development, democratisation, and so on, the objective should be to transfer those tasks as quickly as possible—first, from military to civilian, and second, from international to local control.

Figure 1: Building Security



From Dziezic, 1998


I can illustrate this transfer by looking at the process by which physical security was restored in Bosnia. In this figure, the vertical axis is the potential for organised violence, and the horizontal axis represents time. The grey triangle represents the general pattern of violent incidents. Before the opposing forces were disarmed and confined to camps, there was a high potential for return to fighting. After six months, organised civilian riots were the most common form of violence. Today, Bosnia has a lower incidence of violent crime than Arkansas.

When the international community first intervenes in a protracted social conflict, it must do so with sufficient force to guarantee all the parties to the conflict that they will not be subject to attack *and* that they cannot achieve their objectives by force. The size and capability of the force necessary depends on the degree to which the parties are prepared to co-operate with it.

Military forces are effective at guaranteeing military security against organised military opposition. They are much less effective against riots and civilian disturbances like the ones experienced in Bosnia as the refugees tried to go home. They are impotent in the face of bricks through windows or threatening telephone calls in the night. So we need civilian police in a mission as early as possible.

International civilian police missions do not usually have jurisdiction to arrest or detain. They are there to monitor and assist the local police, providing training on human rights and community policing. When the local police obstruct the process or violate the agreements, as the Serb Republic police did in Banja Luka in 1998, the international police monitors may call upon the military force to shut down a police station, seize illegal weapons, or take action to ensure public safety. The international military force is the backup that helps force violence down to levels where effective civilian police can handle it.

Figure 2: Holistic Approach To Human Security



The problem with simply controlling violence is that police do not operate in a vacuum. They need honest courts, uncorrupted judges, and fair laws. You can't have fair laws and an effective justice system without a functioning government. Government that attempts to do everything is likely to be either inefficient or oppressive or both. And so, in countries like Bosnia, Somalia, Sierra Leone, and other places where human security has utterly broken down, we are faced with a challenge that goes far beyond physical security. We must help to rebuild government and the civil society that is necessary to balance it. We must support the public space in which issues are debated, and help replace the infrastructure of governance—media, meeting places, and community leaders free from fear. When communities have been at each other's throats, as they were in Bosnia, we must help them become reconciled to living and working together again. Throughout this process we will probably have to provide emergency relief to uprooted populations, while trying to help reconstruct essential infrastructure and develop an equitable market economy.


This is a tall order. We can impose military stability, but all the rest depends ultimately on the locals—who must be our allies in the restoration of peace, order, good government, and a sustainable economy. We have seen a mind-boggling array of international organisations and NGOs trying to help this process along in Bosnia, most of them arriving late on the starting blocks in comparison to the military component of the mission.

I'd like to suggest an alternative to this, which would help deployed military forces build human security from the bottom up, fostering local co-operation within each community. I am not suggesting that soldiers do all these things, but that they help to establish a framework that will let civilians—both local and international—do what is needed. Soldiers are well suited to do this, because they come in packets with vehicles, communications, and guaranteed security, and they cover an area like a blanket. A

military deployment can open the door to community-level human security, but they cannot do it without civilian help.

The figure below shows the boundaries of a military unit or formation deployed on a peacekeeping mission. It might be the Canadian Battle Group deployed in Northwest Bosnia, or maybe Canadian troops as part of a British Brigade in Kosovo. Towns are lettered and routes are numbered. Each town has an economic and social zone around it, market gardens, resource extraction, or cottage industry, for example. The dashed line represents a boundary between factions or formerly hostile entities. The hostility doesn't disappear overnight. The boundary, and the difficulty of moving across it, creates barriers to economic and political recovery. The cottage industry in blue is cut off from the town (D) that supplies its labour, and Route 3 on which its exports must move. That is precisely the situation faced by Kostajnica and Novi Grad, two towns where I worked in Northwest Bosnia.

Figure 3: Area Deployment Of A Peacekeeping Force



Now let's consider the list of things that we have to help local people accomplish in *each community* as part of reconstruction. The four blocks to consider (illustrated in Figure 2) are local security, government and civil society, relief and development, and reconciliation. As a civil affairs officer in Bosnia in the first six months of IFOR, I faced several obstacles. I lacked sufficient knowledge of the language, culture, and local history.


I could not find the moderate allies I needed to engage the locals. I was not knowledgeable enough in any of these areas, and I did not have civilian NGOs or international agencies to work with until late in the tour (they arrived between 6 and 12 months after the initial military deployment in most cases).

Over the last two years, the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre has had a chance to experiment with a solution to these problems in co-operation with a small American NGO. Conflict Resolution Catalysts' Neighbourhood Facilitators Project trained 20 local Bosnian Muslims, Serbs and Croats in Banja Luka in a variety of interpersonal and conflict resolution skills. It then trained 16 international facilitators in Nova Scotia and selected five for deployment to Banja Luka. The locals and internationals were brought together in mixed teams, and given further training that reflected the circumstances in Banja Luka, including the difficulties associated with minority returns. A community centre with a mobile team was established, and from March to July of last year, the facilitators helped local people find solutions to their own problems.

The experiment was a qualified success. We learned a lot about the sort of skills that are necessary to solve the problems that remain despite more than three years of international intervention. Crucial to their success was the combination of local facilitators with diverse backgrounds, and internationals who provided expertise and a link to the supporting international community. The key limiting factor was lack of money for salaries and rent, and lack of reach into the surrounding areas, because of security problems experienced by the mobile teams.

From a careful evaluation of the Neighbourhood Facilitators Project and other peacebuilding initiatives, we can come up with a model for community-based civilian peacebuilding teams, that could be deployed at the same time as a military peacekeeping force. For the notional area I have described, this is what a community peacebuilding organisation might look like.

Figure 4: Community-based Model For Civilian Peacebuilding



You can see that each town has a community centre. Each centre has a number of teams, some in the centre, and some mobile. Towns with a lot of cross-boundary movement, or that have many displaced people, or that have outlying areas need more mobile teams. There is a mix of different expertise in each team, depending on the needs of the local community. Our experience was that small-business acumen and knowledge of micro-credit procedures was very much in demand in the city. Elderly displaced people and pensioners, on the other hand, needed help organising themselves to press local authorities for their rights. Out in the villages where the devastation of the war was most evident, reconciliation and practical reconstruction was an urgent need.

What I have described here is not a military organisation. It is, however, a structure that can be deployed and can work closely with military peacekeepers, as the soldiers hold the line against organised violence. Defence budgets pay for peacekeepers. Other departments can pay for other parts of the programme. CIDA pays for international development and peacebuilding. DFAIT supports diplomatic initiatives. Citizenship and Immigration Canada has some money to support refugee programmes. Albanian refugees now in Canada, for example, might be recruited and trained as local facilitators to assist with refugee return.

A community-based organisation with reconstruction skills and knowledge of the local language, culture and history works like the diplomatic equivalent of bare-foot doctors. They bring problem-solving and human security solutions into the communities in which our military peacekeepers are preserving the peace. By focusing at community level, they can act as the glue that binds together all the other scattered international initiatives that are such a co-ordination nightmare in Bosnia today. Because they incorporate local facilitators right from the beginning, they form a basis for community development that will eventually help the international intervention to leave with a stable legacy on the ground.

This is one way to organise our national contribution to peacekeeping and peacebuilding, so that our military forces make a concrete contribution to human security where it really counts—for individuals and their immediate community.

How can Canada's forces contribute to global human security?

What I have described is remedial action, made necessary by our failure to prevent the disasters we see in the news every day. I would like to spend the last few minutes talking about a more strategic and preventive contribution that professional military forces can make to human security. Canada can help to teach the world's armies.

Doctors around the world co-operate to control infectious diseases and find cures. They rarely see their colleagues in other countries as competitors, still less as enemies. This perspective is part of their professional development.

Remarkably, of about 189 states only a handful have irreconcilable and consistent enemies as neighbours. Canada has none. Yet we are part of the world's most powerful military alliance and retain a professional and well-educated army with sophisticated weapons. When you examine the pillars of Canadian defence policy, I think you will agree that Canada uses its comparatively small defence assets as a tool for control and prevention of violence, through collective security and international peacekeeping.

The perspective of the officer as a manager of violence has been part of my professional development over twenty years in the combat arms. I think that perspective is very attractive to many countries, and we can foster it through supporting education and training of foreign officers at places like the Canadian staff colleges, the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, and the Royal Military College.

But permit me to return to the medical analogy for a moment. Antiquated and ill-equipped hospitals are not at the forefront of teaching medicine. Combat aircraft, ships, and armoured vehicles, artillery, and combat capable forces are the tools violence, but also the tools for managing violence and supporting human security as we see in Kosovo today. If we cannot hold our own as combat-capable military professionals, we cannot claim to teach others about conflict management. Countries don't send officers to Iceland to learn about soldiering.

Conclusion

The end of the Cold War has resulted in an increase in the security of states, no longer faced with a nuclear stand-off or regional rivalry between superpowers. There has been no corresponding increase in the security of individuals in many countries of the world. Protracted violent conflicts rage in the Balkans, the Caucasus, Africa, and South Asia. We need to develop better ways to help these countries towards national and human security. Military support for community-based civilian peacebuilding is just one possible model. Changing the way professional armies think about managing violence might ultimately serve both human security and national security.

